關懷倫理的道德蘊涵：試論女性主義的道德知識生產與實踐

Moral Implications of Care Ethics: a Study on Feminist Transformations of Moral practices

本文所呈現的三個理論蘊涵是以關懷為中心形成的三個角，道德等差性、道德個別與信賴三者息息相關，以母子（女）依靠關係構成根本信賴為關懷倫理的核心，然後由親而（道德偏私）疏、由內而外（信賴），由德性而原則（道德個別）。以上的三角形代表對傳統道德哲學的逆向思考，因為一向以人人獨立、自主與平等為道德法政哲學的核心，從而強調道德無私、道德（原則）普遍主義與道德契約，這個鐵三角一直屹立不搖，天經地義。但是通過女性道德知識生產者的努力，從男性與女性所面對的全然不同的生命處境──家庭外的兄弟之義與家庭內母子（女）依靠關係，就不難發現所謂的天經地義的鐵三角，究其底蘊，是建立在男性的生命處境與經驗上，如果拿來評量女性的道德成熟度，那麼後者不是被譏為道德不成熟，要不就是女性深深的被這種道德觀所異化。 關懷倫理所形成的三角形處處指向女性的生命處境與經驗，該理論不會異化女性的生命經驗，是女性想要的道德理論。此據，站在這個三角上也就代表著對道德理論的重新評估，進而從價值轉換的觀點下，將向來被貶抑的道德等差性、道德個別與依靠信賴扶正，賦予其正當性。因此，一旦肯定關懷倫理的三角形所代表的逆向思考並進行道德重新評估之際，面對來自公正倫理學的種種相關批評，包括：等差性的偏袒與裙帶主義、心理過度投射 (sss) 與枉顧陌生人的道德義務；關懷的規範性仍然理論的優先於關懷的道德實踐；以及強調愛的禮物的非經濟價值始終是對女性照顧的剝削與壓迫，女性的關懷倫理也能夠正面迎擊，一一化解這些指摘，作出恰當的回應。 此外，女性主義道德知識生產不僅僅在於從更為貼近生命與自然感情的現實處境上，重新評估並進行價值轉換，從而確立關懷倫理與正義倫理學彼此分庭抗禮，平分秋色。而是更進一步的思考如何將私領域的等差性、個別性與信賴延伸至公領域，從而擺脫道德最低要求的醜化印象。因為，如果公領域挾其一視同仁、講究原則與尊重協定進入私領域時，往往冠以「道德最高要求」的美名，那麼為何將關懷知覺與關懷德性向外擴展，不也應該被看成是「道德最高要求」？可見，女性主義道德知識生產不僅止於提供性別化的倫理學，而是期許能夠從關懷的三點基礎上，繼續思考如何能夠將關懷德性擴展於公領域，從而能夠超越性別化的道德觀點，產生更高的理論視野，達到親疏兼顧、內外一貫、實踐與原則並存。 所以，女性的道德知識生產還有長路要走，因為如何站在關懷的三角形上去建立更高的道德視野，超越之前性別化與二元性的道德性別化，將是關懷倫理的當代挑戰與願景。

This essay brings forth three implications of care ethics for the purpose of demonstrating care ethics’ complete and full challenge to the modern moral theory. These implications are (1) caring as moral partiality towards one’s near and dear; (2) caring involving concern to the particular other with thick understanding of all the relevant background; and (3) caring as intimate trust between the loved ones. However, the full recognition of these implications has been obstructed and blocked by moral impartiality that demands equal concern to all, by moral universalism that requires universal principles (of duty) across people, and , and by moral contracturalism based upon moral agreement of the free agents. Following Gilligan’s insight of drawing attention to gendered-sensitivity to moral theory, the re-evaluation of women’s experience and its relevance to the development of moral theory can enhance the full recognition of the moral worth of partiality, particularity and trust. In addition to the re-evaluation of women’s moral experience closely associated with mother-infant base trust, which is in contrast with men’s public image as the equal agreement between brotherhood, this essay also put great attentions to the objections confronting moral partiality, moral particularity and trust. These objections are, to name just a few, partiality as a kind of favourtism is biased and blind to the strangers’ interests; caring particular one without the guidance of normative care is either over-involvement or self-indulgent; and trust without justice can only sustain the exploitation of the vulnerable one, mainly women. These roadblocks put great challenge to the full implications of care ethics. However, the way leading to the solutions of these difficulties would promise a even higher vantage point, from which we can envision a gender- neutral moral system based on emotional dispositions like sympathy and empathy, which can balance intimate caring (to one’s near and dear) and humanitarian caring (to one’s far and strange), can motivate action by empathic immediacy, and can cultivate autonomy within dependent relation.