社會建構中的「實在」

Reality in Social Construction

七十年代時，英國愛丁堡大學的一群科學社會學家，提出了日後被稱作「社會建構論」(social constructivism)的「科學知識的社會學」(sociology of scientific knowledge)，主張不僅社會文化因素會影響科學家的活動，而且科學知識本身也無可避免地是由其所決定；科學知識是利益、權力、意識型態等種種社會因素所建構而成的；是科學家和社會群體的實踐、生活與互動中磋商或折衝(negotiation)後才約定的，因此只是一種在社會文化中所形成的共識(consensus)；科學知識不是如過去學者所想像般單純地反映自然實在；它不是由自然決定，而是由社會決定。法國科學人類學家拉圖(Bruno Latour)，在1979年出版了《實驗室生活》(Laboratory Life)一書（與英國科學社會家伍爾加(Steve Woolgar)合著），標誌了社會建構論走向研究「科學實踐」(scientific practice)與「科學的微結構」(microstructure of science)之新階段。拉圖也被視為社會建構論的大將。然而，很快地，在八十年代中起，拉圖慢慢與社會建構論分道揚鏢、劃清界限，而且反過來批判社會建構論。因此惹得社會建構論的先驅者布魯爾(David Bloor)的不滿，於1999年發表〈反拉圖〉(Anti-Latour) 一文。在很多科學家和部分科學哲學家看來，社會建構論是一種相對主義、反實在論，和科學家與科學實在論者的立場大異其趣。後者相信存在一個自然實在，科學知識的目的在描述這自然實在，它不是相對於社會文化的。科學家以「你相信實在嗎？」來質疑社會建構論者－－包括拉圖。拉圖對這個問題的反應是：太荒謬了，為什麼我們要強調我們相信「實在」？因此他寫了《潘朵拉的希望》(Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, 1999) 一書來討論「實在」的問題。本文希望環繞在「實在」的概念上，來檢討社會建構論與拉圖的新立場。一方面，我們想指出拉圖對「社會建構論」的批評的確是誤導了；另方面，我們想針對「實在VS虛構」的問題進行分析，並論証在虛構的某個意義（純虛構）上，拉圖的建構論與社會建構論（的科學觀）都無法回答這個問題：「（科學）如何辨識（蓄意的）純虛構？」從而也無法說明科學的這項辨識能力。

In 1970s, a group of sociologists of science at Edinbourg University proposed a 'Strong Program me' for sociology of scientific knowledge which have been called as 'social constructivism' in later years. It claims not only that scientists' activity is influenced by various social and cultural factors such as interest, power, and ideology, but also scientific knowledge in itself is ineluctably determined and constructed by those factors. Science is a kind of products out of negotiation and interaction between scientist and their social background; it's no more than consensus formed in some certain society. Bruno Latour, a French anthropologist of science, had published Laboratory Life (whose co-author was Steve Woolgar, an English sociologist of science) in 1979. The work is a milestone of social constructivism and marked a new stage in which the subject of science studies is scientific practice and microstructure of science. Latour was ever being regarded as an important contributor of social constructivism since then. Afterward Latour started in 1980s to develop his own new doctrine that denies the dichotomy of nature and society. He even challenged the concept of society in social constructivism. The challenge invoked a defense from David Bloor, the nomenclator of Strong Progamme, who published 'Anti-Latour' in 1999. For many scientists and philosophers of science, social constructivism is a relativist, anti-realist sort that is quite different from the position of scientist and scientific realist. The later convince that a natural reality exists and its operative laws can be revealed. The goal of science is the grasp of reliable knowledge that reflects the reality of nature. Scientists issue a question, do you believe in reality, to social constructivists including Latour who is always lumped under the camp. Latour's reaction to the question was: How absurd! Why do we have to emphasize our belief in reality? He hence wrote Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (1999) for the cunning notion of reality. This paper is to examine both social constructivism and Latour's new position by the focus on the concept of reality. I attempt to endorse Bloor's accuse of Latour's misunderstanding on one hand, and analyze the problem of reality by means of the pair, reality vs. fiction, on the other hand. I'll argue that neither social constructivism nor Latour's doctrine can answer to the question: How does science tell what is pure fictitious from what isn't?