從胡塞爾之邏輯的現象學來看卡納普之《世界的邏輯構造》

A Critical Evaluation of Carnap's The Logical Construction of the World via Husserl's Phenomenology of Logic

為了對歐陸哲學與英美分析哲學做一比較與與結合的工作，本文以邏輯為主題來探討胡塞爾現象學與邏輯實證論間的差異，並且從胡塞爾之邏輯現象學來看卡納普之《世界的邏輯構造》。我們將針對邏輯的意義，以及科學世界是如何建構或構成的課題來討論。這原則上是討論胡塞爾與卡納普對本為觀念性對象之邏輯或科學世界所做的不同理解方式，理解方式之不同將影響到人類在世的不同立足方式，而他們之不同理解可歸結於其對各個課題中之生活性因子與邏輯性因子的不同重視程度。

The chief purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast Logical Positivism with Husserl's Phenomenology in respect to the issue of the meaning of logic and that of the nature of scientific world. More specifically, it is to provide a comprehensive review of Carnap's The Logical Construction of the World (Der Logische Aufbau der Welt) in the light of Husserl's Phenomenology of Logic. It is discovered that even though Carnap and Husserl both regard logic and scientific world as ideal objects, the two philosophers nonetheless hold distinctive views on the manner how they understand those objects. This divergent understanding may decide what and how the human beings are in the world. The divergence has its root deep in their different conceptions of the significance of the Life-Factor or the Logic-Factor involved in the meaning of logic and the construction (or constitution) of scientific world.