程伊川與朱子之基本分歧――一希臘哲學的視點

On the Essential Distinctions between Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi — From the Standpoint of Greek Philosophy

傳統以來，於宋明儒學之分派上都只傾向於凸顯程伊川與朱子的相同點，然卻均忽略了兩者其實還有一不同的基本分歧。於補救此一缺失上，本文首先透過一種與希臘哲學的對比，論證兩者的關係在不少重要的關鍵上好比柏拉圖與亞里士多德的異同。一方面，與柏拉圖酷似，伊川採取一種「離俗向真」的進路；而另一方面，與亞里士多德相近，朱子則取徑於「迴真向俗」。其次，雖然伊川已有「常知」與「真知」之區分，但本文將論證：只有朱子方能進一步緊扣「情知」以論「常知」之可能性。最後，本文將指出：與伊川仍囿於「道德之情」不同，朱子已能進致「倫理之情」的開出。

In the traditional typology of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, there is a tendency in neglecting the essential distinction between Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, despite their belonging to the same school. In order to overcome such a limitation, this paper first of all tries to show that their difference can be clarified in terms of the contrast between Plato and Aristotle at certain key junctures. Secondly, it will argue that although the distinction between “general knowledge” and “true knowledge” was introduced by Cheng Yi, only with Zhu Xi’s identification of “general knowledge” as “knowing by feeling” that its possibility can be well-grounded. Finally, it will show that with his affirmation of ethical feeling Zhu Xi is able to transcend the boundary of Cheng Yi’s doctrine of moral feeling.