英文摘要 |
There are two levels implied in the topic of this article. First, it concerns the idea of truth in religion, which is fundamental as far as philosophy of religion is concerned. Secondly, it is a quest for the discrimination between orthodoxy and superstition, which is more practical in character. If scholars are interested in the first question, laymen will possibly be more occupied with the second. That is to say, they will be more occupied with the question as to how to refuse superstition, and how to orientate themselves more easily to orthodoxy, that is, to truth in their own religion. This article starts from an analysis of the status questionis. The perspective from which it reflects on is that of religious dialogue. It is of the opinion that the discrimination between orthodoxy and superstition is not easily made. It is only through a long-term dialogue with others, or even a cruel challenge by others that we can clarify problems, even the very dark side in our own faith. And what is more important is not to point out others’ superstitions, but to discern that, under our own solid faith, hidden superstitions can also be found. After having elucidated the status questionis, the article continues to analyze the dialectical relationship between rational and emotional (irrational) elements in religion, thus to sort out some workable methods for discriminating orthodoxy and superstition. It then discusses how to clarify our own superstition through religious dialogue. The last paragraph elucidates the three elements in an ideal religion, that is, the sacramental, the mystical, and the ethical, through a discussion of the unrecogniziblity of the holy. |