英文摘要 |
In early 1962, the Chinese Communist Party summoned more than seven thousand cadres to a working conference in Beijing. Traditionally, the conference has been interpreted as a forum where Mao Zedong and his successor Liu Shaoqi clashed over their analysis of the three years' famine, with the former blaming natural disasters and the latter human failures; and thereupon Mao chose Lin Biao to be his successor over Liu, and soon the Mao and Lin collaborated to launch the Cultural Revolution. CCP historian Zhang Suhua has used new textual and interview source materials to recreate the conference in detail. This article uses her findings to argue for a different conclusion, highlighting Mao's ability to control and guide the conference and to elevate it from the level of implementation to the one of ideological consensus. Rather than the appearance of division between Mao and Liu, it was the success of the conference that led Mao to repeat the same experiences during the Cultural Revolution and bring about political disaster. In the cadres’ conference, Mao was able to mobilize lower cadres to control the higher cadres, but in the Cultural Revolution, he could not control the Red Guards and the radicals, thereby ending up with the inevitable interposition of the army. Contrary to Zhang Suhua's emphasis on Mao's democratic techniques to forge consensus at the meeting, this article portrays Mao as a superb manipulator of democratic centralism rather than a genuine practitioner of democratic principles. |