英文摘要 |
The Fraud-on-the-Market (FOTM) theory, recognized in the Basic case by the Supreme Court of the United States, has been widely accepted in Taiwan to entitle the class action plaintiffs to the presumption of the existence of transaction causation. In the United States, it was suggested by the accepted wisdom that the FOTM theory i based on the efficient capital market hypothesis until the Supreme Court makes it clear in the Halliburton case in 2014 that this is a wrong interpretation of Basic. In the light of comparative law, from the beginning of the legal import, Taiwanese courts rarely examine the market efficiency before granting the presumption. Furthermore, the mainstream view in Taiwanese legal scholarship appears to favor the plaintiffs by relieving or mitigating the burden of proof in the element of loss causation. This is also very different from the U.S. regime. By juxtaposing the FOTM theories applied in the United States and in Taiwan, this article tried to shed light on the relationship between the element of transaction causation and the policy considerations for securities class actions. In addition the different treatment of loss causation in both regimes can also be better understood through the lens of policy making. This article argues that this insight is important in both perspectives of legal interpretation and policy change. In terms of legal interpretation, this insight can guide us in how to create the presumption of transaction causation in holder action and negligence cases, both of which can be raised in Taiwan but not allowed under the Rule 10b-5 in the United States. In terms of policy change on the securities class action regime, this article argues that a substantial reform would cause much disruption to the application of current rules, and offer a proposal to fine tune the Investor Protection Center-oriented system. |