公共事務委外契約監督條款之研究

The Study of Supervision Clause in Outsourcing Contracts of Public Affairs

政府業務委託民間辦理是期望藉由民間豐富資源及經營效率，縮減政府規模和職能，進而減輕財政負擔。然而，在執行業務委外過程中仍有缺失亟待改進。本研究透過對政府業務委外過程的調查研究，探討不同的交易經驗、組織層級及委外業務的結果可衡量程度對契約監督條款的影響，並進一步探究監督條款與事後交易成本及夥伴信任關係的關聯性。實證結果顯示，交易經驗對監督條款的細緻程度有正向顯著的影響；外包業務產出結果的可衡量性對契約監督條款有負向顯著影響；相較於地方政府，中央機關會設計較綿密的監督條款。此外，設計較細緻的監督條款會增加事後交易成本，也就是說，為了防止受託者的投機行為，須擬具較細緻的監督條款，並落實履約監督、管理，方能達到公共事務外包的既設目標。最後，契約監督條款的設計對夥伴間的信任關係是不存在的，表示公部門和民間廠商的夥伴信任關係並不會從契約的監督條款中凸顯出來。

Relying on the resources and efficiency of private sector, outsourcing strategy used by the governments is expected to reduce the size of government scale and functions in order to alleviate the financial burden. However, there are still operating deficiencies need to be improved. In this study, we examine 85 outsourcing cases of public affairs in Taiwan to explore the impact of outsourcing experience, level of organization and outcome measurability on supervision clauses in outsourcing contract. The relationships among supervision clauses, ex post cost and trust are also been tested. The results show that outsourcing experience of the public sector has positive effect on supervision clauses while outcome measurability has negative effect. Compare to local governments, central organs have denser supervision terms in their outsourcing contract. Additionally, we also prove that the more complex the supervision clause is, the higher the transaction cost will be. We can than make a conclusion that in order to prevent opportunism and achieve the presetting goal of outsourcing, supervision clauses must be dense enough and be thoroughly implemented.