總經理雙元性、家族控制與研發投資

CEO Duality, Family Control and R&D Investment

本研究應用多種理論基礎，將以往學者用以探討總經理雙元性影響公司整體績效的理論基礎，延伸至探討總經理雙元性對研發投資決策的影響。實證結果顯示，總經理雙元性的存在，有助研發決策的形成，此外，實證結果亦顯示，公司所有權為家族所控制時，將對總經理雙元性與研發投資之間的關係產生負向的調節效果。本研究提供重要的商務意涵，亦即，若公司欲投資研發創新活動時，應考慮由董事長兼任總經理，從而加速創新研發決策的形成。然而，當公司為家族所控制時，則不利於董事長兼任總經理時對研發決策的制定。

Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, this study applies the theoretical base that is used to investigate the CEO duality-performance relationship to examine the effect of CEO duality on R&D investment. We find that CEO duality has a positive impact on R&D investment. We also find family control negatively moderate the relationship between CEO duality and R&D investment. Our study not only highlights the importance of board structure in affecting the decisions of corporate R&D investment, but also shows the possibility of family control in changing the fixed relationship between board structure and R&D spending.