論剝奪人身自由之正當法律程序：以「法官介入審查」機制為中心

The Due Process Requirements for the Deprivation of Physical Freedom: Focusing on Judicial Intervention

我國憲法第8條保障人民身體之自由，惟其有關剝奪人身自由之正當法律程序要求的適用範圍為何，學說與實務始終爭議不斷。就此，本文透過系爭憲法條文之文義、歷史及體系等解釋因素的分析，並顧及司法院大法官相關的解釋例後認為，憲法第8條的程序保障，固然僅直接適用於刑事或其他處罰案件類型的人身自由之剝奪，但非屬此種類型者，仍應予以類推適用。換言之，立法者針對人身自由之剝奪而規範其程序時，即使在非屬刑事或其他處罰案件類型的情形，也必須設計出一套即時有效的法官介入審查機制，始能符合憲法保障人身自由之意旨。至於這一套機制具體上究應如何設計，本文則藉由對現行新修正之提審法的評釋，分別從審判權之歸屬及審查程序之建構等兩方面，提出若干觀點，以供未來立法實務參考。

Albeit Article 8 of the Constitution guarantees the physical freedom of a person, the scope of due process requirements thereof remains a controversial issue in both the academic discussions and legal practices. This paper examines various factors including text, history, structure of the constituional provision, and related constitutional interpretations made by the Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan. This paper then argues that although the due process requirements provided in Article 8 of the Constitution apply admittedlt to criminal defendants, the requirements shall apply to non-criminal defendants by analogy. In other words, when prescribing due process requirements in terms of physical freedom, the legislature should provide an immediate judicial intervention for both criminal or non-criminal defendants, in accordance with the Constitution. For a specific institutional design, this paper comments upon that the newly-amended Habeas Corpus Act, and makes suggestions in response to jurisdiction and review process for future reference.