非《傳習錄》：馮柯《求是編》析評

Against Ch’uan-hsi-lu: A Critique of Feng K'e's Ch'iu-shih-pien

王陽明的《傳習錄》，最能彰顯其哲學思想的義蘊與特色。故在王學的傳播中，《傳習錄》是王門的「經典」，頗受矚目。即使是明代朱學學者，都不得不加以正視。就在明中葉王學盛行之際，朱學學者馮柯(1523～1601)即對《傳習錄》作出回應，撰寫《求是編》一書。雖然從歷史溯源與著作形式上來看，《求是編》似乎是第一本《傳習錄》評本。但本文卻從《求是編》的內容著眼，旨在分析馮柯辯駁陽明《傳習錄》的主要義理論點，探討其論點是否持平？其論證是否嚴謹？故本文除說明馮柯撰寫《求是編》的用意外，分別從以下的論題：（一）朱陸是非、（二）《朱子晚年定論》、（三）心即理、（四）良知與知行、（五）格物、致知與誠意，先客觀地分析馮柯辯駁《傳習錄》的諸論點與論證過程。其次，再以陽明的哲學思想為主要判準，對馮柯的論點與論證加以衡定，指出：（一）朱陸是非不是儒釋之辨、（二）《朱子晚年定論》不是朱子晚年悔悟問題、（三）「心與理一」不等同於「心即理」、（四）「良知」與「知行合一」自有殊勝義、（五）格物、致知、誠意實為一事。透過縝密的義理分析與衡定後，筆者發現馮柯對陽明思想的詮釋，誤解多於理解，全然不相應。因此，筆者斷言：馮柯《求是編》不應是第一本《傳習錄》評本，而是第一本「非」（否定）《傳習錄》之作。筆者也希望在此義理分析的基礎上，把《求是編》視為朱、王哲學相對立與激盪的一個實例，進一步思考明代朱學所面臨的理論困境與王學可能潛伏的危機。

Wang Yang-ming's Ch'iu-shih-pien is a work which best shows the richness and uniqueness of his philosophical thought. For this reason, in the heritage passed on to Wang's students, Ch'uan-hsi-lu was a classic which received a lot of attention. Even the followers of Chu Hsi in the Ming period had to take it seriously. In the middle of the Ming, when Wang's influence was greatest, Feng K'e (1523-1601), of the Chu Hsi school, offered Ch'iu-shih-pien, written as a response to Ch'uan-hsi-lu. A historical retrospective or form analysis might indicate that Ch'iu-shih-pien seems to have been the first critical treatment of Ch'uan-hsi-lu. However, the aim of the present essay is to look at the work's content, in order to ask whether, when Feng K'e rebutted the major philosophical ideas of Yang-ming's Ch'uan-hsi-lu, he was able to maintain a fair dialogue, and was able to adduce stringent justification for his ideas. Therefore, besides explaining the basic ideas Feng K'e brought to the writing of Ch'iu-shih-pien, the present work pursues an examination of the following topics: (1) Who was right and wrong in the dispute between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan; (2) Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun (The definitive views from Chu Hsi's later years); (3) The Heart/Mind (hsin) is Principle (li); (4) Conscience (liang-chih) as well as Knowledge and Action; (5) Examining Things (ke-wu), Extending Knowledge and Sincerity. First, we objectively analyze the various arguments and justifications Feng K'e adduced in the course of rebuttal of Ch'uan-hsi-lu. Then, using Yang-ming's philosophical thought as the major standard of judgement, we assess Feng K'e's arguments and justifications, pointing out: (1) The question of who was right and wrong in the dispute between Chu His and Lu Hsiang-shan is not the same question as the debate between Confucianism and Buddhism; (2) Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun (The definitive views from Chu Hsi's later years) does not involve the question of whether Chu Hsi came to regret his errors in his later years; (3)“The heart/mind (hsin) is one with principle (li)” is not the same as “The heart/mind is principle”; (4)Conscience and “The unity of knowledge and action” are different domains, each with their own particular significances; (5) Examining things, extending knowledge and sincerity are in fact all the same set of affairs. Through detailed philosophical analysis and assessment, the author discovers that Feng K'e's interpretation of Yang-ming's thought contains more error than it does understanding; there seems to be no interaction between the two men's views. For this reason, the author concludes that: Feng K'e's Ch'iu-shih-pien should not be considered as the first book to treat Ch'uan-hsi-lu critically; rather it is the first “Anti-Ch'uan-hsi-lu” work, a work to negate Ch'uan-hsi-lu. The author also hopes that on the basis of this philosophical analysis, Ch'iu-shih-pien can be seen as an exhibit demonstrating the opposition and jostling of the Chu and Wang schools of philosophy; from here, we hope to further consider the theoretical difficulties encountered by Chu's thought in the Ming Dynasty, and the potential crisis of Wang's school.