英文摘要 |
The distinction between the “kingly way” (wang tao) and the “hegemonic way” (pa tao), a focal point of Mencius’ political philosophy, has incited various discussions and disputes. A major controversy, among others, involves the following question: whether this distinction is a matter of degree or a matter of essence. This author proposes the latter, because such a distinction is logically implicated in Mencius’ differentiation between “rightness” (i) and “profit” (li). Mencius’ distinction between the kingly way and the hegemonic way denotes a viewpoint of “Gesinnungs-ethik,” which, while presupposing the heterogeneity of the “good,” may involve the principle of utility as a derivative moral principle. In the debate between Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang over the historical status of Han Kao-tsu and Tang T'ai-tsung, therefore, Chu Hsi better uncovered the connotation of Mencius’ distinction between the kingly way and the hegemonic way. Confronted with Ch'en Liang's challenge in terms of the historical actuality of “tao,” Chu Hsi argued that the deeds of Han Kao-tsu and T'ang T'ai-tsung had already embodied the “tao” in a tacit manner. Nevertheless, unlike Kant and Hegel, Chu Hsi did not move forward to deal with the issue of human desires as a motive force of history. Chu thus left hidden an important dimension in Mencius’ political philosophy, which has continued to arouse queries and debates. |