董事分期改選制度之研究－從德拉瓦州最高法院Airgas案件為出發

On Staggered Board: from the Case of Delaware Supreme Court Airgas v. Air Products

董事分期改選制度（staggered board, classified board）於美國法之實踐上已行之有年，惟在我國現行公司法制下可否採行該制度？該制度是否宜明文引進我國？國內之相關討論尚不多見。本文將從2010年美國德拉瓦州最高法院Airgas案件出發，以美國法制、相關學術研究與實踐經驗為比較法之研究分析對象，探討在我國現行法制下是否得採行董事分期改選制度，並進一步從我國公司治理與企業併購等角度分析我國是否宜明文立法引進該制度。本文認為，在分析董事分期改選制度於美國之相關研究與經驗，並思考我國實務運作、公司股權結構之現況，強制累積投票制、任意解任董事之相關規定，以及企業併購價值等因素後，對於我國是否應立法明文採行該制度係持較保留的態度。

Staggered board is (or was) a common practice in many public companies in the United States. Can companies in Taiwan adopt such staggered board under existing Company Act? Shall we recommend the explicit enactment of staggered board in Taiwan? Starting from the 2010 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Airgas case, this article will research and analyze the above issues by taking reference from the U.S. scholarship, studies, practice, and statistics. After considering the U.S. experience and studies, the current Taiwanese corporate governance practice, the shareholding structure, mechanisms of mandatory cumulative voting, director removal without cause and corporate control market, this paper takes a conservative attitude toward the enactment of staggered board into the Taiwanese Company Act.