核心代理問題之道德風險對高階經理人薪酬與企業績效關係之影響

The Effect of Moral Hazard of Core Agency Problem on the Relationship between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance

本研究探討高階經理人薪酬與企業績效間的關係，主要檢定核心代理問題所引起之道德風險是否干擾薪酬績效敏感度。我們採用2006 年至2013 年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，以Shaw and Zhang (2010) 模型進行實證。結果發現，高階經理人的薪酬同時反應盈餘績效及股價績效。另外，相對於績效中等的組別，在企業績效較差及較佳的組別，高階經理人的薪酬對盈餘績效敏感度顯著下降，顯示台灣上市櫃企業高階經理人的薪酬設有上下限。再者，在企業績效較佳的組別，高階經理人的薪酬對股價績效敏感度顯著較弱，這樣的結果與董事會運用裁量權調整薪酬績效敏感度，以降低事後結算問題的成本一致。最後，以盈餘績效為基礎時，控制股東的控制權與盈餘分配權偏離度越大，則薪酬績效敏感度就越高。顯示核心代理問題造成的道德風險，會使得控制股東以提高薪酬對盈餘績效敏感度的方式掠奪小股東的利益。

This paper explores the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance with a primary focus on the moderating effect of moral hazard of core agency problem on pay-performance sensitivity. The sample comprised listed firms in Taiwan during 2006~2013. The pay-performance relation is examined using the model proposed by Shaw and Zhang (2010). Empirical results indicate CEO compensation could reflect not only earnings but also stock return performance of the firm. The sensitivity of CEO compensation to earnings is significantly lower among firms with a poor or high level of firm performance compared to that among firms with an intermediate level, suggesting the presence of both lower and upper bounds on the CEO compensation. Besides, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return is also significantly weaker among firms with better firm performances. This evidence is consistent with Broads of Directors using discretion to reduce the costs of ex post settling up problem. Finally, if firm performance is evaluated by earnings, a greater deviation of control right from earnings distribution right will lead to higher pay-performance sensitivity. This implies the moral hazard caused by the core agency problem may motivate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders by increasing the pay-performance sensitivity.