英文摘要 |
In this article, I examine three of the arguments that constitute the framework of Professor Philip C . C. Huang’s ambitious book, Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing (1996). His arguments under examination here are: (1) Qing courts in practice protected the rights of litigants through adjudication of civil disputes in accordance with state law; (2) actual practice of justice differed from the Qing State’s official representation (or state ideology) concerning the maintenance of social Order; (3) development of civil law in Republican China can be seen as an extension of the “practice” of Qing China. Section 1 is an introduction. In Section 2, I examine Wang Huizu’s famous phrase, “Tingduan yifa”(adjudication needs to be carried out by law), cited by Huang as the basis of his argument. In this phrase “fa” meant punishment, not law; the phrase meant“handle the dispute as a criminal case and apply appropriate punishment, ”not“protect the right of the litigants in accordance with positive law.” In Section 3, 1 explain the internal logic by which the Qing system adjudicated civil disputes in its framework of criminal justice, and demonstrate that there was no “paradoxical disjunction” between the official representation and the practice of the Qing justice system. In Section 4, I discuss the limitations of Qing civil justice from a different viewpoint than that of Professor Huang’s. In Section 5, I discuss the relationship between the Qing and modern Chinese legal systems, and question Professor Huang’s modernist interpretation of history. |