英文摘要 |
Most of the international investment agreements (IIAs) such as bilateral or multilateral investment agreements (BITs/MITs) as well as investment chapter in free trade agreements (FTAs) provide investor-state arbitration as primary means of investment dispute resolution under the framework of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States; (ICSID Convention). Many of these IIAs require pre-arbitration procedural conditions to be satisfied in order to initiate arbitration. Among those procedures, “waiting period” demands the disputing parties to firstly attempt to settle the disputes through direct negotiation; disputes could be submitted to arbitration only if they could not be settled within a specific period. The characteristic and legal effect of such waiting period play a crucial part to the procedural interest of the investors. If an arbitral tribunal considers it as mandatory, early submission to arbitration which violates the waiting period might result in the dismissal of the claims based on lack of jurisdiction. Cases like Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic and Enron v. Argentina held contrary opinions in this regard. As the principle of stare decisis is generally not applicable in international arbitration, it brings uncertainty and instability to investors and hinders their procedural interests. In addition, if a tribunal considers waiting period as mandatory, could the investor-claimant relies on the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause to refer to a less restrict pre-arbitration treatment contained in a third party IIA in order to bypass the waiting period under the current IIA? The case law, as demonstrated in Maffezini and Saline v. Jordan is also inconsistent. These issues deserve further analysis so that recommendations could be given to government concerning future IIAs negotiation and that assistance could be provided to Taiwanese investors for their procedural protection. |