家族公司的代理問題與正直聲譽如何影響法人說明會之召開？

How Agency Problem and Reputation for Integrity Influence Family Firms’Conference Call Disclosures?

本研究探討家族公司與召開法人說明會之關聯性。由於家族公司在股權結構及家族管理之特性，比較容易產生控制股東與小股東之間的代理衝突，加之文獻及報章雜誌皆指出家族公司間之正直聲譽具有明顯差異性，因此本研究探討進一步探討家族公司之自願性揭露政策是否會受到控制股東之控制權與現金流量權偏離以及家族公司之正直聲譽所影響。由於正直聲譽難以衡量，因此本研究以媒體報導作為正直聲譽之代理變數，並進一步將報導內容區分成正面報導與負面報導。研究結果指出，家族公司雖然較願意召開法說會且具有較高之召開頻率，然若控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權，或具有負面報導時，則會降低自願性揭露之意願與頻率。此外，本研究並未發現具有正面報導之家族公司具有較高之自願性揭露水準，顯示正、負面媒體報導與公司自願性揭露具有不對稱之關連性。

Whether family firms are more likely to disclose voluntarily is an empirical issue. In this paper we examine whether family firms are more likely to provide conference calls in comparison with non-family firms. We also argue that the propensity of family firms in Taiwan to provide conference calls is affected by two characteristics, namely, (1) the divergence between controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights and (2) family integrity, which are the unique features of family firms that affect business prospects. We find that family firms are more likely to hold conference calls regardless of the kind of information disclosed. However, further analyses show that family firms facing agency problem due to the conflicts between controlling and minority stockholders exhibit a lower likelihood of providing a conference call. In addition, low-integrity family firms, measured via negative media coverage, are less likely to hold a conference call and have lower conference call frequency.