自願性資訊揭露與強制性資訊揭露之盈餘管理

Voluntary Information Disclosure and Mandatory Information Disclosure of Earnings Management

台灣主管機關近年來積極推動公司治理，特別是藉由法規的修訂，鼓勵企業自願性資訊揭露以改善企業的資訊揭露及透明度，從而強化投資人對資本市場的信心。但自願性資訊揭露的品質，仍受到相當多的質疑。因此，本研究的主要目的探討上市（櫃）公司管理當局對自願性資訊揭露與強制性資訊揭露，是否會因揭露方式的不同而影響盈餘管理，並運用班佛法則以位數分配之情形來檢驗不同揭露方式下之稅前淨利的數據分配是否有異常之現象。本研究依實證結果有以下結論，一：本研究發現在自願性資訊揭露部分有盈餘管理之現象。二：自願性資訊揭露偏離班佛法則的幅度大於強制性資訊揭露部分。代表自願性資訊揭露存在較明顯之盈餘管理狀況。因此建議未來能針對自願性資訊揭露機制與配套措施加以調整與管理，將有助於整體企業財務資訊揭露透明度的提升，並能真正達到自願性資訊揭露之效益。

Recent Taiwan authorities promote corporate governance to enhance firms’ information transparency particularly through the revised laws and regulations and reduce the external investment of asymmetric information in order to strengthen investor confidence in capital markets. However, the accuracy and reliability of voluntary information disclosure are still considerable doubt. This study investigates the effects of earnings management on voluntary and mandatory information disclosure and adopts Benford’s law to examine whether the financial statements of earnings data manipulation easily affected by the management. Empirical results indicate earnings management behavior exists on both voluntary information disclosure (pre-tax net income monthly) and mandatory information disclosure (pre-tax net income quarterly, pre-tax net income yearly). Further analysis finds that voluntary information disclosure deviated from the Benford’s law are larger than the mandatory information disclosure. The findings provide the empirical evidence of voluntary information disclosure tends to have strongly incentive on earnings management than mandatory information disclosure. Government authorities might consider strengthening governance and monitoring mechanism on voluntary information disclosure.