英文摘要 |
This study focuses on initial public offerings (IPOs) firms’ strategic accounting reporting and examines whether IPO firms use both discretionary accruals and mandatory earnings forecast to signal their stock value in Taiwan. Additionally, prior studies suggest that signals act as either substitute or complement in a multiple-signaling environment. As managers choose both discretionary accruals and mandatory earnings forecast in conveying their private information, it is interested to examine such signals independently or jointly (substitution vs. complements) interact in IPO valuation. The results evidence that positive discretionary accruals and mandatory earnings forecast are all credible (valuerelevant) signals for IPO firms’ signal their values. However, the negative discretionary accruals show moderate value signaling in the samples. It is also found that there is a complement positive/negative association between discretionary accruals and mandatory earnings forecast, yet, distinguished the incentives of IPO firms’ reporting is necessary. This study demonstrates some diagnostic checks and evidences the results are robust to the various specifications. |