英文摘要 |
The purpose of this paper is to identify whether the corporate governance mechanism is a major determinant for IPO firms which intend to attract the institutional investors. Does IPO’s corporate governance matter to institutional investors? This paper examines the effect of corporate governance mechanism induced by ownership, board and firm structures, and information disclosure on institutional investors’ shareholdings. The result indicates that firms with higher blockholder shareholdings, more control shareholders on the board, better information disclosure, and the controlling shareholder not serving as president or CEO at the same time would attract more institutional investors. Even though the performance is poor, more control shareholders on the board still could loosen expropriation and draw more institutional shareholdings. The influence of corporate governance on institutional investors is weak as the firm performs better corporate governance. After the rule’s requiring setting the independent directors, the influence of corporate governance on institutional investors does change. However, the effect of the independent directors on the institutional investors exists only when the interaction term of control shareholders on the board and independent directors is concerned in the model. The positive impact of independent directors is proved. It shows evidence that the independent directors could substitute for the control shareholders. The results remain the same after controlling for additional corporate governance and control variables, elimination of widely held ownership firms, and adopting different proxies. |