美國、日本、南韓與我國問題金融機構處理模式之探討

The Resolution Models of Problem Financial Institutions in United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan

本文就巴塞爾銀行監理委員會對問題銀行立法準則與處理工具，以及美、日、韓等國家處理問題金融機構的模式與其成效作一整理，再探討我國面臨的問題及因應對策。從各國經驗得知，非存款債權之賠付乃金融重整期間必要之惡；存款保險機制運作之彈性及存款保險機構之組織結構特殊性，應與監理機關獨立行使職權同等看待；監理機關的寬容措施為另一種形式的道德風險等。綜合而言，我國處理問題金融機構的模式有進一步改善空間，並應完備關閉金融機構法則、時機，以及暢通接管至清理的運作機制等。

This article summarizes the supervision guidance and resolution tools of the Banking Committee on Banking Supervision in dealing with weak banks, and the current resolution models of problem financial institutions in United States, Japan, and South Korea. It also assesses the related issues and advises the regulatory authorities the corresponding solutions that directly address the nature of Taiwan’s banking system. The experiences for the resolution of problem financial institutions in the world shows the necessity of the pay-off to the non-deposits’ holders in the times of financial distress, and keeps the deposit insurance system flexible and the deposit insurance institution independent. Furthermore, the governance forbearance is equal to one of the moral hazards’ type. To address the above challenge, the authority should continue its effort to strengthen techniques for resolving the problem financial institutions like US and South Korea, and formulate the mechanism of bank closure rules and the timing of bank closure, especially including the transit from the conservatorship to receivership of the regulatory rules to the financial institutions.