英文摘要 |
This essay discusses current Taiwanese regulatory reforms on mergers and acquisitions with interested management involved, examining the Company Act, the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (the “M&A” Act), the Securities and Exchange Act, and related rules and regulations. Provisions regulating management buyouts (MBO) or going-private transactions in the draft amendment to the M&A Act proposed by the Executive Yuan (the 2013 proposal) are emphasized in particular. This essay, in the beginning, introduces facts and legal issues in the 2013 Dell Inc. MBO, where Michael Dell’s acquiring group made legal arrangements to sanitize underlying conflicts of interest. This planning might be incentivized by statutory requirements and current development of common law in Delaware. In particular, in Kahn, et al. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., et al. (decided on Mar. 14, 2014), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision in In re MFW Shareholders Litigation (2013) and adopted its formulation of the standard, holding that the business judgment standard of review will be applied in controller buyouts if and only if: (i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a special committee and a majority of the minority stockholders, (ii) the special committee is independent, (iii) the special committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively, (iv) the special committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price, (v) the minority vote is informed, and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.
In contrast, Taiwan’s Company Act initially furnishes cleansing devices such as the duty of interested directors and shareholders to abstain from exercising voting rights. These requirements, however, are exempted under Paragraph 5 of Article 18 of the current M&A Act in merger transactions given the government’s belief in the promotion of merger flexibility. What is more, the 2013 proposal will expand the application of the aforementioned exemption to other M&A types, implying that the government might have decided to further abandon one of the “safe harbor” procedural protections—the approval by a majority of the minority stockholders—just to pursue the M & A efficiency. In other words, the official comment on Article 6 of 2013 proposal reveals that special committees are introduced by referring to Delaware common law doctrines; however, the majority-of-the-minority approval, the other cleansing device of dual procedural protections, is abandoned by the Executive Yuan to a broader extent. This policy choice can be described as incomplete legal transplantation of corporate governance. Faced with this determined regulatory policy, we, in order to protect minority shareholders, cannot but suggest building up supportive mechanisms for the other safeguard—special committees, which should be independent, fully empowered to negotiate and say no, and fully informed before the approval of a majority of committee members. Furthermore, we should pay attention to the composition and operation of special committees and their independent consultants. Together with fiduciary duties clearly defined and appraisal remedies strengthened under the 2013 proposal, we could thus strike a balance between investor protection and economic demand for interested M&A transactions. |