論美國法上法院對行政行為的司法審查密度－－以通訊傳播行政為中心

On the Standard of Judicial Review of Agency Actions in the U.S. －With a Special Focus on Cases Relating to Communication Administration

近年來通訊傳播管制爭議層出不窮，行政法院屢屢成為通訊傳播業者與國家通訊傳播委員會（NCC）的決戰場域。本文嘗試透過美國法的整理與比較，以通訊傳播行政為例，結合行政法總論與各論的分析，為，檢討行政法院在擇定審查密度時應有的思維取向。借鏡美國法的實證經驗，本文發現，行政法總論上的各種審查基準，其簡約、抽象的用語，對於「法院應該以什麼樣的尺度對系爭管制措施之合法性進行評價判斷」此一問題，並不能帶來清楚的指引。故本文主張，法院的審查密度，必須藉助各論的視野，掌握各個行政領域的特性，才可能發展出一個合理、可預測的司法審查模式。例如，對於通訊傳播行政的司法審查，在機關有無管制權限此一面向上從寬、為何採行某種具體管制措施之理由的審查則從嚴。本文以為，像這樣不對稱的審查態度，頗能與通訊傳播行政的特質相呼應，有為我國司法實務參考之價值。最後，本文建議法院在審查密度的選擇上，應採取較為「動態」的思維，除了機關的獨立專業性外，案件中法院審查重心在「可否管制？」抑或「如何管制？」、機關權限是否獲得具體明確的法律授權、乃至做成決策所踐履的程序正當性程度的高低，都應成為個案中影響法院控制行政行為審查密度的因素。

By comparing with the court’s practices in the United States, this article aims at contemplating a way to reach a “reasonable” and “predictable” level of scrutiny of judicial review of communications administration. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) stipulates the scope and standard of judicial review of administrative action by using different terminologies such as “arbitrary and capricious” and “substantial evidence”. Under different circumstances, a reviewing court has the power to review relevant questions of fact, the agency’s interpretation of statutory provisions, and the reasonableness of administrative discretion based on the respective standard. This article argues that the differentiation among the “Fact, Law and Discretion” trichotomy, as well as the different normative terms that APA prescribed, have little contribution to help decide the adequate level of judicial scrutiny in a given case. Thus, for determining the level of scrutiny, this article suggests that a dis-integration approach of administrative law would provide a more robust rationale than the traditional approach stemming from the general principles of administrative law. Therefore, taking communication administration for instance, this article then analyzes U.S. court’s leading cases and finds out a trend that the court tends to leniently allow the Federal Communication Commission a broad regulatory authority, while reviewing its reasoning of taking a certain regulatory measure somewhat stricter. This article argues that this “asymmetric-model” of judicial review may be an appropriate compromise corresponding to the characteristics of communications law. Finally, after examining the judicial control of the National Communications Commission in Taiwan, this article recommends the administrative court to adopt a “dynamic approach” which all the necessary criteria, including whether the authority has been authorized clearly and concretely by law, and how due the administrative process is… etc., has been explicitly considered in determining the level of scrutiny so as to enhance the reasonableness and predictability of judicial review.