司法過程的政治約束——我國基層人民法院審判委員會運行研究

Political Constraint of Judicial Process: A Research on the Adjudication Committee of a Chinese Basic-level People's Court

我國基層法院的審判委員會制度具有緩解矛盾、遏制腐敗、提高辦案質量、接近案件真相等功能。審判委員會討論的案件並不都是重大疑難的案件，有一些僅是審判委員會與法官之間的分權性案件，還有一些屬於案清簡單但處理起來比較棘手的案件。對多數基層法院人員而言，法官只是一種職業，要求所有法官都是法治的殉道者並不現實。審判委員會在討論決定案件時，面臨著一定的政治約束，考量的因素經常是當事人、媒體、上訪、社會穩定等問題；實踐中，不少超越法律的判案，具有特定的制度邏輯。在討論審判委員會組織的改革方向時，將其改組為諮詢機構的設想，或許具有可行性。

The Adjudication Committees of some Chinese basic-level People' s Courts function as conflict resolving, corruption restraining, improving case-handling quality, and giving a close approximation to the truth of the cases. Not all cases submitted to the Adjudication Committee are serious and complicated. Some cases are discussed due to the fact that they are not easy to handle, or the judicial power is separated to both committees and courts. Judges are not bound to be the martyr to the rule of law, especially the primary judicial practitioners, to whom it is merely a profession. Moreover, when trialing, the Adjudication Committees are constantly restrained by certain factors such as the parties, media, petition as well as social stability. Some adjudications beyond the law have been interpreted by specific institutional logic. One feasible solution to the restructure of Adjudication Committees is to adjust the present organizational form into the mode of consultative committee.