績效、公司治理與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究

An Empirical Study on the Relationship among Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover

從高階管理者離職探討公司治理效力是近來一重要議題，文獻指出有效的公司治理機制可發現高階管理者異動與公司績效呈負向關係，本文以臺灣上市公司為例，從高階管理者離職探討公司內部治理與外部治理之效力，首先係探討臺灣地區上市公司績效與管理者離職之關係，並檢定高階管理者離職後績效是否顯著改善，再檢視高階管理者持股、外部治療機制與績效之交互作用對高階管理者離職之影響，本文的高階管理者包括董事長與總經理。
本文發現，不良績效公司的高階管理者離職機率較高，且總經理離職之後，公司股價績效顯著改善，顯示市場對總經理離職有正向評價。然而，高階管理者持股比例降低績效與離職間之負向關係，本文以外部董事比、機構法人持股比及外部大股東代表外部治理，結果發現外部治理變數與董事長持股比之交互項無顯著負相關，此外，外部大股東對監督高階管理者扮演一重要角色，雖然高階管理者持股比與離職呈負相關，但外部大股東的存在，減緩總經理持股對離職的負向影響。

An issue, which has recently assumed importance, is the studying of the effectiveness of corporate governance from the point of top executive turnover. Published paper has shown that the likelihood of top executive turnover is negatively related to firm performance in effective corporate governance situation. This paper researches the effectiveness of internal corporate governance and external corporate governance in relation to top executive turnover in Taiwan stock-listed firms. First we test top executive turnover rate in relation to the firms performance. Furthermore, we examine the improvement in firm performance subsequent to top executive turnover. Finally, this paper tests the impact of the interaction of management ownership, external corporate governance and firm performance on top executive turnover. In our paper, the top executives include the president and the general manager. We find that the turnover rate of top executives is significantly higher in poorly performed corporations. However, after the general manager leaves, the stock price of the corporation is significantly higher. This result shows that investors respond well to general manager turnover in Taiwan stock-listed firms. As top executive ownership increases, the negative relationship between corporation performance and top executive turnover rate reduces. In this paper the external governance refers to external director ratio, institutional holding ratio, or external blockholders. The finding is that the interactions between the variables of the external governance and president’s ownership are not significantly negative. This represents that within our country the external governance system can weaken the negative. This represent that within our country the external governance system can weaken the negative effect of the president’s ownership on his turnover. Furthermore, external blockholders play a significant role in monitoring the general managers in the corporations. Although the amount of holding of stocks that the general mangers own are inversely related to their turnover, the existence of external major stock holder reduces the negative effect of general managers’ ownership.