英文摘要 |
Divided government exists where different political parties control the executive and legislative branches in a political system. This has become a common feature of Taiwan’s national and local political landscape. For one, the Democratic Progressive Party won the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections and acquired the ruling power over the central government, while the Kuomintang still controlled the majority of the Legislative Yuan. When there is divided government, since different political parties control the executive and legislative branches, the operation of party government is weakened, as the two political institutions are in conflict with each other. This certainly makes responsible and efficient government an unattainable goal. However, the question concerning the consequence of divided government—are the social welfare system and the country´s social welfare spending became less well under divided party control?—remains contentious. This study explores this relationship by comparing the government subsidies for low household income families (by the indicators of 'social welfare spending") under the DPP-led divided government (2000-2008) with subsidies under two periods of the Kuomintang-led unified government (1996-2000 and 2008-2012). It is hypothesized that the policy-making under unified governments tends to be conducive to social welfare spending while policy gridlocks under divided governments tend to have a negative impact. The findings reveal that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, unemployment rate, divided government, and presidential election year are statistically significant determinants on the expenditures for the government subsidies for low household income families. This study concludes that divided government should be an important issue of studying the public policy and social welfare, deserving further academic attention from a comparative perspective. |