環境規範綠色供應鏈績效之研究

Environmental-Regulation Green Supply Chain Performance

隨著綠色消費需求日益增加與政府環境規範日趨嚴格，已促使企業必須實施綠色供應鏈，建構綠色產品，以提升通路及企業競爭力。然而，如何領先導入綠色供應鏈管理，迎接此波世界性綠色環保議題，將是企業所要面對的首要任務。本研究針對單一零售商與單一製造商之二階通路，在寄售合約下探討積極推動綠色產品供應鏈與被動推行綠色產品供應鏈兩種模型對通路績效之影響及其應對策略，以提供企業與政府致力綠色產品時之參考依據。本研究設定零售商扮演通路領導者，決定營收分享比例；製造商扮演追隨者，決定產品零售價格及生產數量。本研究結果發現，供應鏈之產品環保設計水準會顯著影響產品零售價格、生產數量與營收分享比例之決策，進而影響通路利潤。積極推動綠色產品供應鏈之產品環保設計水準與通路利潤改善程度呈反向之關係。本研究建議政府應逐步提高環保規範標準，並制訂適當獎勵措施與懲罰條款，以激勵企業更積極投入綠色產品之建造，使環境得以永續發展。

As the growing green consumer demand and the increasingly strict environmental norms， enterprises have been encouraged to implement green supply chain for green products， in order to enhance the competitiveness of the enterprises and their supply chains. However， the leading import of green supply chain management to meet this worldwide environmental issue is the primary task to be faced by the enterprises. This study examines the difference in the channel-wide profits of the active and passive green supply chains in a two-layer channel structure. A retailer， acting as a leader in the channel， offers a manufacturer a revenue sharing under consignment contracts， who specifies the percentage allocation of sales revenue between her and the manufacturer. The manufacturer， acting as a follower in the channel， retains ownership of the product and decides the product quantity and retail price. The numerical results show that the solution generated by the active green supply chain outperforms that by the passive green supply chain in maximizing the channel-wide profit， subject to the degree of product eco-design. This study suggests that the government should gradually raise environmental standards， and develop appropriate incentive and penalty provisions while anticipating and encouraging enterprises to contribute to environmentally friendly products.