英文摘要 |
Prior studies suggest that there are two coexistent yet unlike to be mutually exclusive motives for managers’ real earnings management: opportunistic earnings reporting hypothesis versus informative size-adjusting hypothesis. The former hypothesis suggests that strategic real activities manipulation deteriorates the earnings informativeness, in turn, decreases the value-relevance of earnings. Yet, the latter hypothesis argues that firms may seek to signal their future operating performance by way of real activities adjustment then increases the value-relevance of earnings. This study conjectures that the monitoring role of institutional investor can enhance the informative components of managerial real earnings management, then, improve the informativeness of accounting numbers. We thus use institutional investor’s ownership as a mediating variable, then, examine the effect of real earnings management on the value-relevance of accounting numbers. The empirical results support the opportunistic earnings reporting hypothesis and reveal that the real earnings management is negatively (positively) associated with the value relevance of earnings (equity book value). Incorporating the role of institutional investors into consideration, it is found that higher institutional investor’s ownership enhances both the value-relevance of earnings and the equity book value for firms with large magnitude of real earnings management. This study demonstrates some diagnostic checks and evidences the results are robust to the various specifications. |