環境政策與生產結構

Environmental Taxes and Global Sourcing

本文應用一南北國模型探討環境政策差異對北國廠商生產決策的影響。本文假設中間財的生產過程會排放污染。在考量兩國污染稅、生產成本及契約成本下，北國廠商在本國自行生產、南國自行生產、本國外包及南國外包中選擇最有利的中間財生產方式。本文研究結果顯示當不完全契約造成的扭曲效果大時，廠商會偏好自行生產；而當扭曲效果小時，廠商會偏好外包。在北國污染稅高於南國的情況下，當兩國污染稅相對低時，北國廠商會選擇在南國生產；當兩國污染稅相對高時，北國廠商會留在固定成本較低的北國製造。此外，兩國環境政策差異的加大，會提高廠商選擇外包的可能性。本文結果亦為污染庇護所假說為何在實證上無法取得明確證據提供了一個理論的解釋。

This paper applies a North-South framework to investigate the organizational choices of the North final good producer in the presence of environmental taxes. The final good is developed in the North, and the intermediate polluting input can be produced in the North as standard vertical integration, produced in the South as FDI, outsourced from the North or outsourced from the South. The production of intermediate polluting input will be charged an environme-ntal tax. When the environmental tax is higher in the North, the final good producer's sourcing choices mainly depend on the contract cost. When the contract cost is high, the North final good producer tends to keep the production of the intermediate input within its boundary as standard vertical integration or FDI. The location of production is influenced by the environ-mental tax. In contrast to the pollution haven hypothesis, we find that the North final good producer would produce in the South (North) when the environmental tax is relatively low (high). Moreover, our results show that the North final good producer would be more likely to outsource when the international difference in the environmental policies is relatively high. This paper provides a theoretical explanation on why the empirical support for the pollution haven hypothesis is weak.