Since 1993, when reform-minded judges launched a judicial independence movement at the Taichung District Court, more than thirty years have passed. However, the internal management and operations of the court system during this period have not been thoroughly studied or examined domestically. This paper attempts to explore mechanisms within Taiwan’s judicial system, including the Judicial Personnel Review Committee, the case submission system, the term of office and transfer of court administrative positions, judicial ranks, supervision of judges, the submission process, and the allocation of administrative affairs returning to judges’ meetings. By observing the structural changes of these mechanisms, the paper investigates the characteristics of judicial administration in Taiwan after democratization and its impact on judicial independence. The paper argues that post-democratization judicial administration in Taiwan, under judicial reforms, exhibits the following characteristics: a weakened interference of judicial administration in adjudicative independence, which simultaneously promotes the enhancement of judicial independence; increasing participation of lower-level judges in judicial administration; and a trend toward greater institutionalization and rule-based practices. Moreover, this represents a long-term developmental process. The institutionalization and regulation of judicial administration, along with the protection of judicial ranks, have also reduced judges’ incentives to comply with higher-ups in case handling, fundamentally limiting the scope for interference with judicial independence.