民意代表對地方政府「越位監督」之探討

A Study on Legislator’s“Offside Supervision”of Local Governments

我國地方制度法自1999年1月公布施行以來，在地方自治組織的營運上，地方制度法第3章第4節以下分就地方立法機關以及地方行政機關，就各自的組織與職權等重要事項予以規範，構成了我國地方自治層級二元民主(dual democracy)制度下監督與制衡的基本構造。從釋字第498號解釋作成後歷經20餘年的當前時空來看，有關民意代表對地方政府之跨政府「越位監督」，亦即：中央民意代表將監督對象鎖定地方政府，抑或地方民代將監督對象鎖定於其他地方政府的現象，型態更五花八門，益加饒富趣味。從法律觀點予以詮釋與評價，當有理論與現實的價值，本文爰就相關課題進行探討。

Since the promulgation and implementation of the Local Government Act in January 1999, the operation of local self-governance organizations has been regulated by Chapter 3, Section 4 of the Act, which provides the organization and powers of the local legislature and the local executive authorities, and constitutes the basic structure of supervision and checks and balances under the dual democracy system at the local self-governance level in Taiwan.
Nowadays, more than 20 years after the Interpretation No. 498 of the Judicial Yuan has been made, the governmental representatives’cross-government“overstepping supervision”has been developed into multiple types; for examples, the central governmental representatives targets their supervision on local governments, or the local governmental representatives targets their supervision on the other local governments. Interpreting and evaluating this phenomenon from a legal perspective has both theoretical and practical value, and I would like to discuss the relevant issues in this paper.