大股東推動併購交易其對價之合理性──以資訊揭露規範為核心

How to Protect Minority Shareholders in M&A Transactions Involving Related Parties–Regulatory Requirements on Information Disclosures

企業併購，倘交易雙方無任何關係，市場運作基本上會保障價格公平性，無須多加規範，但在關係人交易，管理層或大股東占有資訊及控制優勢，可能濫用權力掠奪不當利得。資訊揭露是各國常用的管制手段，惟臺灣目前距充分資訊揭露仍有相當距離，針對揭露之時效性、內容規範，都存有改善空間。本文建議，公發公司先以軟法強化併購時的揭露，縮短其與取處資產，及公開收購時所應揭露之密度差距，並與程序管控相輔相成，用落實管控程序，來節制管理層或大股東濫權，達到保障外部股東之目的。

In M&A, if this is not a related party transaction, the market will decide what a fair price is, and hence no regulation is required. However, in related party transactions, major shareholders or managers may obtain unfair advantages owing to information asymmetry as well as power of control. Mandatory disclosure is commonly used to curtail such abuse. The M&A practice in Taiwan, nonetheless, showed an astonishing lack of disclosure of key information, and significant room for price manipulation. This article therefore suggests certain soft law mechanisms to improve the disclosure qualities in order to provide minority shareholders greater protection.