特留分拋棄之方式與特留分扣減權之標的及其效力——評最高法院109年度台上字第361號民事判決

Waiver of Compulsory Portion and Exercising the Rights of Deduction of Compulsory Portion: Commen on Supreme Court Civil Judgment 109 Tai-shang-Tzu No. 361

本文以最高法院109年度台上字第361號民事判決出發，輔以法制史與外國立法例的對比關照，重行檢視有關特留分之性質，並針對特留分扣減權之標的中，就遺產分割方式與指定應繼分之差異應如何區分？侵害特留分行使扣減權之效力究屬物權效力或是債權效力？以及特留分之拋棄可否以拋棄繼承的意思表示所包括？等等問題，提出個人看法。

This article starts from the Supreme Court, 109 Taishang Zi No. 361 Civil Judgment, supplemented by the comparison of legal history and foreign legislation, and re-examines the nature of the Compulsory portion. How should the difference between the Appointment of Share of Estates and the Appointment of the Approach of Division of Estates by the Deduction of Compulsory portion be distinguished? Is the effect of infringing the right of deduction in the exercise of the right of deduction belonging to the effect of rights in rem or the effect of rights in personam? And can the waiver of compulsory portion be included in the meaning of waiver of inheritance? And so on, put forward personal views.