The Birth and Rebirth of the Judicial Review in Taiwan－Its Establishment, Empowerment, and Evolvement

臺灣司法違憲審查的誕生與再生──創設、賦權與發展

為什麼臺灣人會認同司法違憲審查？在過去七十年間，什麼因素促成臺灣司法違憲審查的創建、賦權與發展？這是本文所要討論的主要問題。本文一開始簡要介紹幾個解釋司法違憲審查的理論模型，並試圖尋找最吻合臺灣司法違憲審查的理論。然而由於過去臺灣的政治劇變，沒有一個理論可以完整地解釋臺灣的司法違憲審查發展，不同的理論模型只能說明不同階段的臺灣司法違憲審查。在創建時期，憲法法院非常順從，但在轉型時期，如同保險模型所預測的，憲法法院逐漸取回應有的權力與權威。政治環境的不穩定以及缺少過去不容質疑的威權，人們渴望有一個公平且中立的裁決者，而憲法法院正好順勢而起。除了政治操作外，即便是在社會高度分裂的2000年之後，憲法法院也積極、並謹慎的擴張其權力。然而在新興民主國家的脈絡下，司法違憲審查的運作必須特別小心。在一方面來說，司法化的傾向提供憲法法院絕佳的機會參與政治決策的過程，但在另一方面，這也可能造成損及憲法法院威信的政治危機。

This paper first briefly introduces several major models that explain the emergence of judicial review in an attempt to find one that best elucidates the situation in Taiwan. Yet, owing to its particular political history, no single model can fully explain the development of judicial review in Taiwan. Rather, different models may be used to account for different stages. During the foundational stage, the Court was subservient to the authoritarian regime. During its transition stage, the Court regained authority and began to function like a court that insurance theory presupposes. Owing to the changeable political environment and the lack of an unchallengeable authority, the need for a fair and apolitical arbitrator increased, a fact which explains the increase in judicial power. Besides, political manipulation, the Court also expanded its power actively and cautiously, even when society was highly divided after 2000. In new democracies, the tendency of judicialization has provided the Court with more opportunities to intervene in political decision-making processes. Nonetheless, this may spawn unintended political conflict that threatens to damage the integrity and authority of the judiciary.