憲法法庭法官提名與國會同意權門檻──比較法分析

The Nomination of Constitutional Court Judges and the Threshold for Parliamentary Approval: A Comparative Analysis

本研究介紹四個歐洲國家的憲法法院的法官，在送交國會行使同意權時，採取了三分之二以上的加重多數決。該等加重多數決促成了各方會儘量提名溫和派的法官，或者按政黨比例分配而多元，不會只提名偏向單一特定立場的法官。
其次，本研究比較美國、法國、德國、義大利、西班牙、葡萄牙、日本、南韓與台灣職司憲法審查的憲法法院或最高法院。在這九個地區中，四個國家是將提名權力分散給行政權、國會和法院共享。有二個國家將提名權全部交給國會。而美國、日本、台灣卻是提名權全部給總統或總理。台灣大法官任期八年，總統在二個任期八年任內有機會更換全部15位大法官，使所有15位大法官都由單一總統所屬政黨掌控。
因此，要避免台灣賦予總統和行政院長就憲法機關和獨立機關太大提名權，而產生不夠中立的問題，在修憲困難的情況下，可以透過修法，將立法院人事同意權門檻提高到三分之二，促使總統和行政院長與在野黨協商，推出較中立溫和的人選。也建議將人選推薦權法制化，縮短立法院審查時程。並討論人選長期無法產生時如何因應政府職能停擺的可能方式。

The Appointment of Constitutional Court Judges and the Threshold for Parliamentary Approval: A Comparative Analysis
This study examines the constitutional courts of four European countries where the appointment of judges requires parliamentary approval with a supermajority of at least two-thirds. Such a requirement encourages the nomination of moderate judges or ensures a proportional distribution of nominees based on party representation, preventing the appointment of judges with a singular ideological leaning.
Furthermore, this study compares the constitutional courts or supreme courts responsible for constitutional review in nine jurisdictions: the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Among these, four countries distribute the nomination power among the executive branch, the legislature, and the judiciary. Two countries grant the nomination power entirely to the legislature. In contrast, the United States, Japan, and Taiwan vest the nomination authority exclusively in the president or prime minister. In Taiwan, Grand Justices serve an eight-year term, allowing a two-term president to appoint all 15 Grand Justices, potentially leading to a situation where all justices are aligned with the president’s political party.
To prevent excessive nomination power from being concentrated in the president and the premier over constitutional and independent agencies, which may compromise neutrality, institutional reforms are necessary. Given the difficulty of constitutional amendments, a legislative approach could be adopted to raise the parliamentary approval threshold for nominations to two-thirds. This change would encourage negotiations between the president, the premier, and opposition parties, leading to the selection of more impartial and moderate candidates. It is further suggested to codify the authority for candidate recommendation, to shorten the parliamentary review period, and to explore possible mechanisms for addressing situations in which prolonged failure to make appointments could lead to a paralysis of governmental functions.