省思我國公司治理之「軟硬兼施」的漸進式改革模式

Rethinking Taiwan’s Step-by-Step Reform Model of Corporate Governance Utilizing the“Soft- and Hard-Law Approach”

近年來因應ESG時代下，伴隨數位科技發展的脈絡，促使金管會啟動漸進式改革，對資安治理相關規範逐年擴大應適用之產業或企業對象的範圍。吾人回溯觀察我國逾二十年來迄今公司治理法制之漸進式改革的類似措施，舉例言之：首先，為了促進股東行動主義，提供小股東表達意見之管道，於2012年起強制符合一定條件的上市櫃公司採用電子投票，至2018年後所有上市櫃公司皆須採用電子投票。其次，2006年起即有獨立董事兼職之限制；惟由於2016年樂陞案的爆發，使證交所與櫃買中心認為獨立董事服務於過多公司之董事會，將妨礙董事會運行之成效，故以修正上市上櫃公司治理實務守則之方式進一步增加董事兼職的限制。再者，為加強提供董事行使職務所需要之相關治理資訊，正式於2019年起逐年擴大設置公司治理人員之上市櫃公司的範圍。
就上述所例示資安治理規範之推動、強制電子投票、董事兼職之限制及公司治理人員等漸進式的改革措施，本文歸納出我國政府除傳統硬法之政策工具外，似應用行為經濟學（behavioral economics）中之推力（nudge）概念，包含促進社會規範之遵循（compliance with social norms）、社會比較（social comparison）等軟法機制；同時透過類如美國老羅斯福總統所言「溫言在口、大棒在手」之硬法與軟法的並行，設計出具滑坡效應（slippery slope）之漸進式改革策略，以推動我國公司治理法制之改革。然而，此等政策措施固然有利於政府改善我國公司治理的環境，但自行為理論之視角以觀，設計推力或滑坡效應政策之行政官員、專家亦不免會受到認知偏見的影響，因此不可忽視背後潛藏的可能問題。綜言之，本文淺見亦從行為公共選擇（behavioral public choice）之視角，嘗試於理論面提出政府推動前述公司治理政策時之前景以及可能遭遇到的陷阱；尤於美國與歐盟重新檢討ESG相關規範之近日反思背景下，為愈顯常見之「溫言在口、大棒在手」或「軟硬兼施」模式的漸進式公司治理改革等管制策略與政策工具，提供基於行為理論之宜行穩致遠的啟示或建議。

In recent years, in response to the ESG era and the development of digital technologies, Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has been prompted to deploy gradual reforms by expanding the target industries and companies that are purported to be subject to relevant rules of information security governance. A retrospective examination of over two decades of corporate governance legal reforms in Taiwan reveals a similar pattern of phased deployment of reform strategies. For example, firstly, to promote shareholder activism by providing a channel for minority shareholders to express opinions, the government mandated listed companies that meet specific criteria to adopt electronic voting since 2012. In 2018, all listed companies were required to adopt electronic voting.
Secondly, since 2006, there have been restrictions on the number of companies in which an individual can serve as an independent director concurrently. However, the 2016 scam involving XPEC Entertainment (Lesheng) prompted both the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) and Taipei Exchange (TPEx) to deem that independent directors serving too many companies simultaneously may be detrimental to board effectiveness. Consequently, the Corporate Governance Best Practice Principles for TWSE/TPEx-listed companies were amended by TWSE and TPEx to further restrict concurrent directorships. Furthermore, to enhance directors’access to governance-related information necessary for the proper performance of their duties, the government has begun to gradually expand the requirement for companies to appoint dedicated corporate governance officers since 2019.
From the above-mentioned phased deployment of reforms ranging from Information Security Governance-Related Rules or Guidelines, mandatory electronic voting, restrictions on concurrent directorships, as well as the appointment of corporate governance personnel, this article draw lessons that the government appear to apply, besides traditionally hard-law regulatory tools, concepts of behavioral economics including nudge, such as promoting compliance with social norms, social comparison, and other mechanisms of soft law. We argue that the Taiwanese securities authority has been utilizing both soft- and hard-law tactics simultaneously, or the strategy of“speaking softly with a big stick”as advocated by the late President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States; the government designs a staged deployment of reform strategies, with the slippery slope strategy to facilitate Taiwan’s legal reform of corporate governance. There is no doubt that these kinds of policies and measures are beneficial for the government in improving Taiwan’s corporate governance environment. However, from a behavioral perspective, bureaucrats and governmental experts who designed the policies with nudge or slippery slope embedded are also inevitably subject to cognitive biases. Therefore, the pitfalls behind such models of corporate governance reforms should not be overlooked. To summarize, this article employs the lens of behavioral public choice theory to illuminate both the prospects and potential pitfalls of implementing the aforementioned reform strategies in corporate governance. In particular, against the backdrop of renewed scrutiny of ESG-related regulations in the United States and the European Union, this article, from a behavioral perspective, offers insights and recommendations on how to ensure that gradual reforms, especially those employing a“soft-and-hard”or“carrot-and-stick”approach, are implemented sustainably and prudently.