論經濟脅迫的制度構造

《民法典》第150條意義上的“脅迫”應當包括經濟脅迫，即行為人以侵害或威脅侵害絕對權之外的財產權益迫使相對人作出意思表示，典型如債務人以違約要挾債權人接受合同變更。限制經濟脅迫行為既可以維護表意人的意思自治，防止其因締結合同陷入“敲竹槓”困境，也有助於遏制合同關係中的機會主義行為，避免價格機制的運行受到干擾以及社會總體效用降低。顯失公平制度不足以應對經濟脅迫問題。經濟脅迫在構成要件層面無需特殊的構成要件要素。就違法性而言，以違約相要挾的行為均具有違法性，不應承認基于合法行為的經濟脅迫。在判斷經濟脅迫行為與意思表示之間是否具有因果關係時，應當重點考慮表意人是否存在合理的替代措施。表意人是否提出抗議可能影響撤銷權的消滅。

The term“duress”under Article 150 of the Civil Code should be interpreted to include economic duress, meaning situations where a party forces the other party to make a declaration of intent by infringing or threatening to infringe upon property interests other than absolute rights. A typical example is when a debtor uses the threat of their own impending breach of contract to coerce the creditor into accepting a modification of the contract. Regulating economic duress not only protects the autonomy of the coerced party's intention and prevents them from being forced into a“hold-up”situation due to contract formation, but also helps curb opportunistic behavior within contractual relationships, ensuring the proper functioning of price mechanisms and preventing an overall decline in social welfare. The doctrine of unconscionable bargains is insufficient to address the issue of economic duress. From the perspective of legal requirements, economic duress does not require special additional elements beyond those of general duress. In terms of illegality, any conduct that involves using the threat of breach of contract as a means of coercion is inherently unlawful; economic duress based on lawful conduct should not be recognized. When assessing whether there is a causal link between economic duress and the coerced party's declaration of intent, particular attention should be paid to whether the coerced party had reasonable alternative options. Whether the coerced party expressed protest may also affect whether the right of rescission has been extinguished.