| 英文摘要 |
This article investigates statutory reforms within Taiwan’s military justice system during the 1950s, with a specific focus on their application in political cases. The study demonstrates that prior to 1956, military courts operated under an inquisitorial model offering defendants minimal procedural protections; notably, they lacked effective legal counsel, and the adjudication process was subject to intervention by the President or superior authorities via approval mechanisms. By the early 1950s, however, domestic and international pressures catalyzed a momentum for reform. The promulgation of the 1956 Military Trial Act formally bolstered procedural safeguards by establishing appellate reviews and institutionalizing the right to counsel. Doctrinally, the Act sought to assert adjudicative independence by curtailing the approval powers of superior authorities. Nevertheless, an analysis of political cases reveals that superior officers continued to intervene in trials, rendering the realization of judicial independence within the military justice system highly problematic. |