| 英文摘要 |
Developing countries have been rapidly industrializing and urbanizing, often resulting in the demolition of entire areas for new urban redevelopment or the construction of new industrial parks. This phenomenon is particularly evident in China since the Reform and Opening period. Similarly, Taiwan still occasionally experiences such situations. Highlighting its destructive aspect, we might refer to this phenomenon as“Bulldozer Urbanization”: a state of ecological destruction and drastic change characterized by rapid and indiscriminate removal by bulldozers, followed by the construction of new layouts with a cold and cruel appearance. This paper compares the divergent approaches and strategies adopted by the governments of mainland China and Taiwan in dealing with popular religion during the construction of two industrial parks. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of two emblematic cases: the establishment of the Suzhou Industrial Park in mainland China in 1993 and the creation of the Tainan Science Park in Taiwan in 1995. Specifically, it investigates how the two governments dealt with the presence of popular religion—particularly temples and local cults—during the course of construction and land expropriation, and the different strategies adopted in managing, incorporating, or suppressing these religious institutions. To frame this comparison, the study draws on Dingxin Zhao’s tripartite typology of state legitimacy, which distinguishes between ideological legitimacy, performance legitimacy, and what might be called legitimacy rooted in tradition. In the case of the traditional Chinese empire, ideological legitimacy had an exceptionally strong and pervasive influence, penetrating deeply into society, and it was reinforced by performance legitimacy. Together, these two forms constituted the core foundation of imperial rule. Communist China replaced the patriarchal and lineage-based ideological structures of the old order with a new discourse of class struggle and nationalism. Yet, rather than loosening its grip, the regime exercised an even more thorough form of corporeal and social control over its population. After the initiation of the Reform and Opening policies in 1978, performance legitimacy acquired a new and urgent importance. Nonetheless, it continued to be firmly subordinated to ideological legitimacy,, producing a widespread and meaning saturated“silence.” In contrast, contemporary Taiwan—operating under a liberal ideological framework—presents a different configuration. Here, the three types of legitimacy intersect, merge, and balance one another in more dynamic ways. Within the industrial parks, local temples and religious actors negotiated new symbolic forms that were simultaneously recognized by both the state and local communities. These negotiated arrangements produced shared symbols of legitimacy. However, the meanings and practices associated with these symbols quickly diverged among the broader population, generating a plurality of interpretations and enactments. This diversity, in turn, created anxieties for state agencies and public institutions charged with managing such spaces. Yet, crucially, these anxieties did not amount to a direct threat to the construction or reproduction of state legitimacy. By bringing these two cases into comparative dialogue, this paper seeks not only to highlight differences in the governance of religion across the Taiwan Strait but also to theorize the broader processes through which popular religion, state governance, cultural heritage, and local empowerment become mutually constituted. The comparative approach underscores the relative positioning of these elements within divergent political contexts and provides insight into how religion and culture are simultaneously sites of contestation, negotiation, and collaboration in the making of modern industrial and urban landscapes. |