| 英文摘要 |
In recent years, the public has become highly dependent on digital platforms, making the reconstruction of multilateral legal relationships among internet content providers, users, and the state a critical issue. Given the diverse and complex nature of internet service providers—and their varying capabilities in controlling infringing or illegal content—many countries generally classify regulations based on the types of services intermediaries offer, resulting in varying levels of regulatory stringency. This paper focuses on internet content providers that generate communication content or offer search services. Specifically, it examines whether the filtering or screening actions taken by these platforms—particularly regarding cached or stored third-party information—can be considered“quasi-state actions.”If so, these internet content providers may effectively function as substantive public utilities with the authority to regulate online speech, thereby becoming subject to certain constitutional constraints. This paper first explores the legislative origins and practical evolution of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a key statute concerning U.S. internet content providers. It critiques outdated aspects of the legislation based on scholarly analysis, followed by an argument grounded in the boundaries and reconstitution of the“state action doctrine”as developed in U.S. jurisprudence. Through an analysis of representative court rulings, this paper investigates the permissible scope of constitutional constraints on internet content providers. |