| 英文摘要 |
During President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration, U.S. policymakers demonstrated ambiguity regarding the reconstruction of Poland’s provisional government and its border issues, failing to reach consensus with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Poland has become a pawn in balancing the competing interests of the Allies. This article adopts the bureaucratic model as a research approach to examine: (1) President Roosevelt’s leadership style, (2) the border dispute between the Polish government-in-exile and the Soviet Union. This article argues that in the post-World War II global context, President Roosevelt, in pursuit of American leadership, favored cooperation with the Soviet Union. As a result, he adopted a passive stance on the Polish-Soviet border issue. Acting as an ambassador of the U.S. to Russia, William Averell Harriman frequently communicated with Joseph Stalin and revealed a U.S. tendency to remain acquiescent on the resettlement of the Curzon Line between Poland and the Soviet Union, thereby avoiding potential disruptions to future cooperation. |