論我國投票顧問機構之監管──兼論我國設立投票顧問機構之需求

Taiwan Stewardship Principles for Proxy Advisors: Analyzing the Need to Establish Local Proxy Advi

投票顧問機構（proxy advisors）作為機構投資人盡職治理守則中的重要角色，主要工作為向訂閱其服務之機構投資人提供投票建議、代表行使投票權，藉此幫助機構投資人節省研究及投票成本，再從中收取訂閱費。憑藉著向投資人提供投票建議進而左右投票結果，ISS及Glass Lewis此兩大國際性投票顧問機構對公司經營階層取得了相當可觀的影響力。但是隨著投票顧問機構影響力的增長，關於其投票建議之合理性與正確性，以及機構本身的公正性及透明性開始受到各界質疑。因此，應如何監管投票顧問機構逐漸成為國際上討論的焦點。美國SEC對投票顧問機構發布了新規則，歐盟修正股東權利指令增加對投票顧問機構的規範；英國及日本則是在盡職治理守則中新增適用於投票顧問機構的原則。我國盡職治理守則追隨英日之規範模式於二○二三年七月新增原則七適用於包括投票顧問機構在內的服務提供者。但盡職治理守則因缺乏強制力，仍需仰賴投票顧問機構的自願遵循，故本文嘗試討論並分析此類監管手段的可行性及有效性。另外，本文亦嘗試探討我國設立投票顧問機構的必要性及可行性。若於我國設立投票顧問機構，主要的目標客群應為散戶股東，故本文認為最可行的選項係選擇設立帶有官方色彩的投票顧問機構，以解決市場失靈之問題。對此，本文建議可考慮由為保護投資人而設立，且經常性參與股東會並提供意見的「財團法人證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心」來扮演提供投票建議之角色。

Proxy advisors, who play a key role in institutional investor stewardship, offer voting recommendations to and vote on behalf of subscribing institutional investors, thereby saving institutional investors research and voting costs and earning subscription fees in return. By offering voting recommendations to sway the voting outcome of investors, the two major international proxy advisors, ISS and Glass Lewis, gained substantial influence over corporate management. However, as the influence of proxy advisors has grown, questions have arisen regarding the reasonableness and accuracy of their voting recommendations, as well as the impartiality and transparency of the proxy advisors themselves. Therefore, the regulation of proxy advisors has become a focus internationally. For instance, the U.S. SEC introduced new rules applying to proxy advisors and the EU amended the Shareholder Rights Directive II to cover proxy advisors, while the UK and Japan introduced principles for proxy advisors in their Stewardship Codes respectively. In July 2023, following the footsteps of the UK and Japan, the Taiwan Stewardship Principles added Principle 7 that applies specifically to service providers, which includes proxy advisors. However, due to its soft law nature, the effectiveness will rest on the voluntary compliance of proxy advisors. Furthermore, this article also explores the necessity and feasibility of introducing or establishing proxy advisors in Taiwan. If Taiwan were to establish local proxy advisors, it should be targeting the market of retail investors. Therefore, it seems that the most feasible option is for the government to provide funding for local proxy advisors to mitigate market failures. Given such, this article recommends that the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center can play the role of providing voting recommendations, as its mission is to protect investors and it already regularly participates in shareholder meetings and provides opinions.