論僧肇〈物不遷論〉「事各性住一世」爭議

The debate of '' Each thing resides in a period of time by its nature '' in Sengzhao's ''Wubuqian Lun''

僧肇所著的〈物不遷論〉歷來一直被視作中國思想史上的經典之作，然而此論卻在晚明開啟了一場義理解釋上的論爭。其肇端始於鎮澄對〈物不遷論〉中之「事各性住一世」的批評，其認為僧肇所謂「性住」是一種帶有自性有見的外道見解，而鎮澄更認為此論的觀點使得眾生失去成佛的可能性。這樣的批評引發當時各家僧人的反駁，儘管當時批評者眾，然而鎮澄並未接受批評者觀點，始終堅信僧肇此論違反了大乘佛理。本文嘗試從中觀學立場檢證〈物不遷論〉一文，以此回應鎮澄的「〈物不遷論〉外道說」。最終我們發現，僧肇的「性住」應作無自性空解，且正因僧肇持有此一無自性空的立場，其主張無自性的因緣相續、修行果業不滅，使得眾生成佛成為可能，鎮澄批評為非。

Sengzhao（僧肇）'s ''Wubuqian Lun''（物不遷論）has been regarded as a classic work in the history of Chinese thought, but this essay was furiously debated in the late Ming Dynasty. It began with ZhenCheng（鎮澄）'s criticism of ''Each thing resides in a period of time by its nature''（事各性住於一世，林鎮國譯）, who thought that this declaration was by no means an argument that one buddhist should hold, and he further claimed that it would stop people from reaching nirvana. Such criticism was rarely been accepted among monks at the time, however, Zhencheng never changed his mind toward SengZhao's violation to the principles of Mahayana Buddhism. This article attempts to verify the ''Wubuqian Lun'' from the standpoint of ''Madhyamika'', in response to ZhenCheng 's claim——Wubuqian Lun as a none Buddhism view.
In the article, we found that Sengzhao’s“xingzhu”（性住）should be interpreted as the emptiness, or lack of one’s nature, and it is precisely because Sengzhao holds this position that the continuation of causes and conditions without nature and the invanishment of the karma of the practice of cultivation, which makes all livings have possibility to reach nirvana. The reason why ZhenCheng post his argument was understandable, but however, incorrect.