王龍溪〈大象義述〉析論

The Analysis of Wang Longxi's ‟ Daxiang Yishu ”

王龍溪（1498－1583）是明代心學的高峰，也是明代心學易的代表。龍溪之學實以良知為本，《六經》為用，故《六經》退居為闡明良知的注腳，所謂「良知是貫串《六經》之樞紐，故曰﹕《六經》皆我注腳。」（〈水西精舍會語〉）順此而論，《易》的內容遂收縮為一良知而已，故曰﹕「《易》即良知也」（〈答季彭山龍鏡書〉）「《易》，心《易》也，以《易》為書則泥，是皆未明於大《易》之過也。」（〈易與天地准一章大旨〉）《易》為良知、為心《易》，可謂其易學的核心思想。在《王畿集》中，龍溪對於《六經》的引用以《易》為最大宗，他的易學觀點散見於各篇，比較集中且完整陳述的唯有〈大象義述〉。此篇對六十四卦各卦的〈大象〉逐一闡述，並少數引用、廣採或全引程頤《程傳》、朱熹《周易本義》的觀點來析論其中的義理，可見心學家雖反對程朱理學，但在易學的詮釋上，仍有不得不憑藉他們之處。因此，本文將一一比較龍溪與程頤、朱子的觀點，以見其繼承之處。此外，此篇多處融入良知解易，展現出心學易的特色，此特點也是本文大力著墨分析之處。心學解易雖展現出《易》之詮釋之諸多面向之一，然只取能為我所用者而解之，卻忽視大部份《易經》經傳之內容。此種主觀的解經法雖然精采，然也犯了忽略《易經》詮釋傳統之病，故文末簡略評述其詮釋的問題。

Wang Ji (1498-1583) was a mountain in the philosophy of the mind eminent in the Ming dynasty and a representative of Yi study through the philosophy in the era. Longxi based his learning on the concept of conscience, to which the Six Confucian Classics were used as footnotes, and so the content of the Book of Changes in his interpretation was reduced to conscience. Yi as conscience and mind thus becomes the core of his Yi study. In his Wang Ji Ji (Collected Writing of Wang Ji), Longxi quoted mostly from the Six Confucian Classics. Throughout the book that sees a scattering of ideas in his Yi study, the article that has the most focused and complete of such a study is“Daxiang Yishu”(“On the Meaning of Yi Hexagrams”). The article explicates the meaning of each of the 64 Yi hexagrams with morsels of, partial or even complete quotations from Cheng Yi's Cheng Zhuan (Cheng Yi Commentary on the Book of Changes) and Zhu Xi's Zhouyi Benyi (Fundamentals of Zhou Yi). Such quotations show the origins of the contemporary mind philosophers' interpretations in Cheng's and Zhu's neo - Confucianism, to which they reacted. Thus, this research paper compares Longxi's perspective with Cheng's and Zhu's to demonstrate the former 's intellectual inheritance from the latter. The paper also delves into the interpretation of Yi through conscience, which characterises Yi study through the philosophy of the mind. While displaying one of the dimensions to the interpretation of Yi, such a study keeps those ideas pertinent to its own and casts aside most of the other commentaries on the Book of Changes. Even though the subjective interpretation has its own appeal, it ignores the tradition of Yi study. In view of the observation, this paper ends with brief comments on the problem with such an interpretation.