| 英文摘要 |
The demand for intelligent aging services mainly arises from the current elderly population's ''digital disability'' and ''information barriers'', with significant variation depending on personal conditions and application contexts. The state has established a range of legal norms and policy guidance to lay a regulatory foundation for overcoming the ''digital divide''. Yet, issues such as halfhearted efforts in market entities' senior-friendly modification, evident technological shortcomings, and a shortage of manual services continue to impede the adequate and effective provision of these services. The market lacks sufficient motivation to provide comprehensive intelligent aging services fundamentally due to their public or quasi-public goods characteristics, necessitating a supply foundation that transcends market self-regulatory logic. Direct government provision or mandatory market provision may face deficiencies in efficiency and equity, and the multi-relational ''state-market'' space constructed by modern administrative law is a critical basis for supplying intelligent aging services. State intervention of various forms and degrees shapes and regulates the relationship between the state and the market, becoming essential in enhancing the supply of intelligent aging services. Such state intervention should aim for a balance in digital integration across generations, not as absolute equality but as a relative equilibrium that finely considers multiple value goals and constraints. It should help the elderly bridge various extents of the ''digital divide'', based on differences in subjects and contexts while fully respecting market rules and reasonably controlling the supply burden of market actors. The supply mechanism should prompt government-market collaboration, appropriately providing public and quasi-public goods to achieve an optimal balance. Therefore, state intervention should adhere to the principles of basic coverage and supplementary provision. The principle of basic coverage implies that the state should require market entities, primarily platform companies, to take on the universal supply obligation for foundational intelligent aging services and provide reasonable subsidies when their burden becomes excessive. Monopolies can lead to ''deadweight loss'', and a significant proportion of the supply costs for intelligent aging services lies within the region of this deadweight loss. This requires providers with monopolistic characteristics to not abandon the supply within this ''deadweight loss'' area and to not substantially give up on the elderly population, bearing the obligation of supplying intelligent aging services up to the point of market clearance. The principle of supplementary provision means that the state respects market entities' supply of intelligent aging services and appropriately guides and supplements the market supply mechanisms in diverse scenarios. The manner and degree of state intervention in the supply of aging services should correspond to the gap in all spontaneous supply mechanisms, setting diversified institutional safeguards for aging service demands of varying degrees of importance. Once the legal system can clearly distinguish and address the varying needs of the elderly for ''digital inclusion'', relevant departments can select suitable regulatory measures based on different levels of intervention intensity. In the future, based on different algorithm application settings and the need to protect diverse legal interests, the provision of intelligent aging services should be divided into four levels of assistance: level 0 requires no state intervention; level 1 allows for intermediary state intervention; level 2 permits state intervention via resource allocation; and level 3 allows for mandatory state intervention and supports direct state provision. The related system should align each level of assistance with corresponding service contents and regulatory measures to maximize societal surplus benefits. |
本站僅提供期刊文獻檢索。
