英文摘要 |
The relationship between the CPC and the government is one of the cornerstones of China’s socialist constitutional system, and has taken on different forms in different periods: the relationship between the party and the government has continued to evolve after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and the“1982 Constitution”confirmed the political proposition of“separation of party and government”, highlighting the the authority of the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee, and the CPC’s leadership has shrunk to the political, ideological and organizational realms. This framework of party-government relations cannot well adapt to the tasks of reform. In particular, it is difficult for the people’s demands to be reasonably responded to in the increasingly sophisticated legal system. In response to the need to re-adjust the party-government relationship in the New Era, the Institutional reform characterized by the joint office system is an important way to realize the party’s leadership, in which party institutions and state institutions are respectively in charge of powers that are suitable for them to exercise. In a sense, it means returning from“separation of party and government”to“division of labor between party and government.”Through the joint office system, the CPC, with temporal representation pointing to the future and institutional guarantees to avoid bureaucratization, can improve the substantive representation of the people and promote the interaction between the people’s political representatives and legal representatives, thus optimizing the legality chain centered on the state system, and further developing the People’s Congress system under the leadership of the party. Of course, all power should be subject to constraints. The actions of joint agencies should be subject to the review and supervision of CPC’s political accountability system. |