為什麼不中立了？從關鍵時刻、地緣政治與決策模式分析瑞典與芬蘭中立政策調整

Why is Neutrality no longer an Option? An Analysis of the Adjustments of the Neutral Policies in Sweden and Finland from Critical Moments, Geopolitics and Decision-making Patterns

瑞典與芬蘭是歐洲實施中立政策歷史相當悠久的國家，長期以來這兩國選擇中立作為外交政策主軸，不過2022年2月俄烏戰爭爆發後這兩國決意擺脫中立、改以申請加入北約為其新的外交目標，此種策略轉變對兩國與歐洲安全形成很大衝擊。芬蘭已於2023年4月4日加入北約，瑞典雖還未加入，不過該國國內朝野政黨已有共識，視北約為外交政策目標。本文所欲探討者乃是分析這兩國為何調整其長久以來堅守的中立政策理念，過往多數觀點認為瑞、芬兩國拋棄中立乃因俄烏戰爭威脅所致，但實際觀察兩國政策演變，俄烏戰爭僅是政策轉折最後階段，瑞、芬兩國中立政策調整有根本性因素。
本文認為：第一，2022年2月的俄烏戰爭僅是瑞典、芬蘭兩國中立政策轉型的末階段，1995年加入歐盟、2014年克里米亞半島危機、2022年俄烏戰爭等事件是一連串緊密相連、時序相關的重大時刻，這三個時刻不斷削弱兩國中立政策。第二，前述時刻不僅是兩國中立策略的連續轉折點，地緣政治因素還強化了這兩國中立政策調整的動力來源。第三，兩國國內決策模式削弱了由於重大政策調整而可能出現的政治挑戰，共識型決策讓重大政策調整得以獲得國內共識後通過。

Sweden and Finland are countries with a long history of neutral policies, and they have traditionally chosen neutrality as their main direction for foreign policy. However, after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022, both countries have decided to abandon neutrality and adopt joining NATO as their new security strategy. This disruptive evolution of diplomatic strategy has had a significant impact on the security of both countries and Europe as a whole. As of the writing of this article, Finland has already joined NATO on 4th April, 2023, while the process of Sweden's accession to the alliance is not yet complete. Most views in the past believed that Sweden and Finland abandoned their neutrality due to the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, this article argues that the war was only the final stage of a turning point. The adjustment of the neutral policies of Sweden and Finland has fundamental factors.
This article argues that, firstly, the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022 was only the final stage of the foreign policy transformation of Sweden and Finland. The events of the two countries' accession to the European Union, the Crimea crisis in 2014, and the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022 are a series of closely related and chronologically linked major events. These three critical moments have influenced the neutral policy shifts. Secondly, the aforementioned moments not only serve as consecutive turning points for the neutral strategies of both countries, but geopolitical factors also amplify the sources of motivation for the adjustments in their neutral policies. Thirdly, the Nordic decision-making model in both countries has weakened the possibility of political challenges that may arise from major policy adjustments. The consensus decision-making model in both countries allows for significant policy adjustments to be quickly agreed upon and passed.