從視訊股東會到光洋科條款──論後疫情時代下的股東權益維護

From Virtual Shareholders’Meetings to the SOLAR Provisions: Protection of Shareholder Interests in the Post COVID-19 Pandemic Era

現代公司法制咸致力於衡平持股多數之股東與持股少數股東利益之衝突，有鑑於持股少數股東於面對其與多數股東利益之衝突時可能遭受之不利益，而以法律特別賦予少數股東適當的制度上救濟。然而，近三年來由於新冠肺炎疫情之影響，我國公司與證券交易法制的發展，實則有過度致力於公司經營權穩定，過度保守以求穩，在法制設計上強化多數股東對公司之控制與權限，而出現對少數股東權益保護不足之明顯趨勢。因疫情影響而開放的視訊股東會制度、俗稱光洋科條款中關於董事長解任程序與效力規定、以及同屬光洋科條款中關於個別獨立董事之股東臨時會召集權廢除，改由審計委員會決議召集等等法制的修正，無不凸顯我國公司法與證券交易法制於疫情之特殊時期，為求公司經營權穩定與效率，而減損少數股東原本依法得享有之權益的情況，此於疫情期間為尋求公司經營安定與效率所修正制定之法規，於疫情之特殊情境過後，理性討論可能空間漸增之今日，應加以檢討修正，以維護股東權益。

Contemporary corporate jurisprudences among jurisdictions all devote to strike the balance the conflict of interests between majority shareholders and minority ones and to grant the latter, when facing probable disadvantages upon the rise of such conflicts, appropriate remedial mechanisms under corporate law. However, in past three years owing to the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is an apparent trend of pursuing stableness of corporate majority ruling power by strengthening the control and rights of majority shareholders under corporate legal regime. The minority shareholder interests protection accordingly becomes inadequate due to the excessively conservative pursue of stableness. The lift of the ban on virtual shareholders’meeting, the so-called one of SOLAR amendments of the procedure of removing chairman of the board and the legal effects, and the other SOLAR amendment of depriving individual independent directors of the right to call shareholder meetings all manifest the pursue of the stableness of corporate control at the price of minority shareholders after the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. Those amendments enacted and promulgated for the corporate control stableness and efficiency may seem proper in a crisis of COVID-19. When the epidemic recessed and the room of rational discussion regained, those amendments shall be subject to review and reform to protect minority shareholders.