真相委員會承接機制的類型與國際實踐

Follow-up Mechanisms of Truth Commission: Institutional Type and Global Practice

本文旨在探討真相委員會承接機制的類型與國際實踐，並藉此檢視臺灣促進轉型正義委員會的機制安排與潛在問題。在制度優缺點上，本文認為若以國家人權委員會或其他獨立組織作為承接機制時，其優勢是高度自治運作空間，但缺點是脆弱行政指揮權。若以跨部會或單一行政部門作為承接機制時，其優勢是有較豐沛行政資源，但政權更迭是影響此一機制的主要因素。若由國會委員會為承接機制時，雖有較高民主正當性，但政治風險是當國會多數議員與行政部門非屬於同政黨時，在政治對抗下，將面臨資源短缺的困境。
2022年5月，臺灣促進轉型正義委員會解散後，承接機制是由行政院院長擔任轉型正義會報召集人，設置行政院人權與轉型正義處，並將相關業務分散至行政院各部會。本文認為，此方案的優點是易獲得行政或政治資源，但卻有轉型正義政策易受政權更迭影響以及相關政策與措施因欠缺系統化推動而流於片面化與瑣碎化的疑慮。為避免上述疑慮，本文認為政府或應重新思考設置新的組織統合規劃轉型正義的事務。此外，為監測承接機制的表現，監察院國家人權委員會應積極監督與檢討承接機制的表現。最後，公民團體應發揮其影響力，除監督部會承接業務的表現外，也可倡議更多轉型正義的討論。

This paper explores the institutional type and global practice of follow-up mechanisms for truth commissions. This paper also examines the performance of the current follow-up mechanism after the Commission for Promoting Transitional Justice in Taiwan (TJC) was dissolved in May 2022. Regarding the institutional advantages and disadvantages of the follow-up mechanisms, this paper argues that the National Human Rights Commission and other independent human rights institutions established outside the existing administrative body has more autonomy but weaker administrative coordination and resources. Conversely, an interministerial or single administrative body would have better administrative resources. However, such a mechanism would face institutional challenges if the ruling party was indifferent to transitional justice. Moreover, adopting a parliamentary committee as the follow-up mechanism is usually associated with a higher degree of democratic legitimacy; however, this arrangement carries several political risks. If most congressional representatives belong to political parties different from the ruling government, the parliamentary committee will encounter institutional difficulties and resource shortages despite political polarization.
In Taiwan, after the dissolution of the TJC, the prime minister chaired the transitional justice board, with assistance of the division for human rights and transitional justice. Additionally, transitional justice programs were assigned to the various ministries. In terms of institutional advantages, this paper argues that this arrangement makes it easier to receive administrative or political resources. However, doubts remain, such as whether transitional justice is susceptible to regime change and related policies and measures cannot be realized due to lacking systematic implementation. Hence, this paper argues the government should consider establishing a new institution to coordinate the implementation of transitional justice matters. Additionally, this paper argues that the National Human Rights Commission should actively exercise its supervisory function to monitor follow-up mechanism. In addition, the civic groups also should actively monitor the implementation of transitional justice policy.