飛行員董事是否影響投資效率？

Do Pilot Directors Matter in Investment Efficiency?

本研究探討了董事風險偏好對投資效率低下的影響。若董事擁有任何類型的飛行員執照，則認定該董事的風險厭惡程度較低。本研究使用2000年至2010年間標準普爾500指數涵蓋的公司為樣本，發現擁有具備飛行員執照的董事之公司，其投資效率較高，尤以減少過度投資為主。本文利用多種方式處理內生性問題以確認實證關係的穩健性。此外，實證亦發現效率的提高集中在對合資企業和未合併子公司的投資上，而非資本支出之上。當管理者有承擔風險的動機或是較不會利益掠奪時，具備飛行員執照的董事對於增進投資效率的效果更強。該發現與董事風險偏好可有效抑制風險相關的代理成本的假設一致，並闡明了董事會結構如何影響內部監督的有效性。

This study examines the effect of directors’risk preferences on investment efficiency. We define directors as less riskaverse if they possess any form of pilot license. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms between 2000 to 2010, we find that the presence of pilot directors is associated with improved investment efficiency, particularly in terms of reducing overinvestment. We use a battery of empirical approaches to confirm the robustness of this relationship and eliminate endogeneity concerns. In addition, we find that efficiency improvements are concentrated on joint ventures and unconsolidated subsidiaries rather than capital expenditures. The effect of pilot directors on investment efficiency is stronger when a manager is motivated to take risks or is less entrenched, suggesting a complementary effect between the structure of the board and other mechanisms. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that directors’risk preference is effective in curbing risk-related agency costs, and our findings also help further explain how board structure affects the efficacy of internal monitoring.